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Reports of a new severe respiratory disease, now deﬁned as severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), began toemerge from Guangdong,insouthern China,in late2002. Theconditioncame to
internationalattentionthroughanexplosiveoutbreakinHongKonginMarch2003.Casesappeared
throughout South-East Asia and in Toronto, the spread of SARS being accelerated by international
air travel.Aglobalemergency wasdeclaredbytheWorldHealthOrganization,bringing togetheran
international team of epidemiologists, public health physicians and microbiologists to study and
containthedisease.Thisresponsehasenabledthenatureoftheinfectiousagenttobeidentiﬁed,its
mode of transmission to be established and diagnostic tests to be created rapidly.
Introduction
Reports of a new severe respiratory disease began to emerge
from Guangdong, in southern China, in late 2002. It burst
upon international attention through an explosive outbreak
in Hong Kong of what was soon to be deﬁned as severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) in March 2003 (Lee et al.,
2003). The appearance of cases throughout South-East Asia
and in Toronto was accelerated by international air travel
(Poutanen et al., 2003). The World Health Organization
declared a global emergency, bringing together an interna-
tional team of epidemiologists, public health physicians and
microbiologists to study and contain the disease. The co-
ordinated response to SARS by the medical and scientiﬁc
community has enabled the nature of the infectious agent to
be identiﬁed, the mode of transmission established and
diagnostic tests to be created rapidly (Drosten et al., 2003;
Ksiazek et al., 2003). Furious efforts are being made to
determine the optimal treatment regimen and to develop
therapeutic agents and vaccines. Nonetheless, it is a paradox
that, despite these technological achievements, we remain as
vulnerabletothisnewagentasourancestorsweretoprevious
plagues.
Early phase
SARS initially appeared as a small cluster of cases of viral
pneumonia in rural Guangdong province in the People’s
Republic of China, which, although out of the ordinary, was
not considered exceptional. As far as can be ascertained, the
ﬁrstrecognizedcaseofSARSoccurredinFushanCityandwas
reported on 16 October 2002. Three members of the index
case’s family were also affected, but no medical staff. Small
clustersofcaseswerenotedoverthenext3months.Theevent
that was to lead to the current global alert was the admission
of a patient to a tertiary referral hospital in Guangzhou with
presumed viral pneumonia who had been referred from
Zhongshan city outside Guangzhou. He was admitted to the
2ndAfﬁliatedHospitalofSunYet-SanMedicalUniversityfor
2 days, then transferred to another hospital. Following his
admission at the 2nd Afﬁliated Hospital, 28 medical and
nursingstafffellillwithSARS,aswellastheambulancedriver
who transferred him. SARS then spread rapidly to ﬁve
different hospitals and this has just been documented (Zhao
Zhao et al., 2003). The early and high attack rate amongst
hospital staff was to become a constant feature in all further
outbreaks in different countries. The spread of SARS outside
Guangdong province occurred when a nephrologist from
GuangzhoutravelledtoHongKongon21February2003.He
had a 5-day history of respiratory symptoms and was
admitted to hospital on the second day of his stay in Hong
Kong. Unfortunately, while staying at a hotel in Hong Kong,
he is presumed to have infected a couple from Toronto,
Canada, a businessman who travelled to Hanoi, Vietnam,
three people who travelled to Singapore and a number of
Hong Kong residents. All of these people went on to initiate
large outbreaks (Poutanen et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2003).
The SARS coronavirus
It has now been ﬁrmly established that the cause of SARS is a
Abbreviations: HCW, health-care worker; SARS, severe acute respiratory
syndrome.coronavirus (Drosten et al., 2003; Ksiazek et al., 2003), and
Koch’s postulates were fulﬁlled fully when experimental
infection was achieved in macaques (Fouchier et al., 2003).
The sequence contains nine novel viral proteins for which
sequence analysis has predicted functions. Coronaviruses
typically have narrow host ranges and are signiﬁcant veter-
inary pathogens, causing severe bronchitis, peritonitis and
gastroenteritis in different animal species. Human corona-
viruses fall into groups 1 and 2 and are responsible for about
one-third of upper-respiratory-tract infections (Rota et al.
2003). At least two examples of this virus have been fully
sequenced, and this work demonstrates that the SARS agent
is not related to any of the three previously described
coronavirus groups (Rota et al., 2003; Marra et al., 2003).
It should not be a surprise that the SARS coronavirus is
different from previous members of this genus, as the
behaviour of the pathogen differs markedly from human
coronaviruses described previously. The virus may have
acquired a conserved motif, s2m, from avian infectious
bronchitis virus but, apart from this, there is no evidence
of any exchange of genetic material with non-Coronaviridae
(Marra et al., 2003; Rota et al., 2003). This is consistent with
the hypothesis that a previously unknown animal corona-
virus has recently mutated, developing the ability to produc-
tively infect humans. There are some indications that the
civetcat,eatenasadelicacyinsouthernChina,wasthesource
animal.
Not only did this virus differ genetically from other corona-
viruses isolated in humans, but it behaves differently from
other human coronaviruses and most other respiratory
pathogens. The mortality rate appears to be very high
(Tsang et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2003). Elderly patients with
pre-existingrespiratorycomplaintsareespeciallyvulnerable.
This must be compared with acute community-acquired
pneumonia, which has an approximate case fatality rate of
5% for those patients admitted to hospital, but this
represents the tip of a substantial iceberg of clinical disease
managed in the community with negligible mortality. It is
not yet known whether some patients may be infected with
theSARSagentanddevelopfewornosymptoms.Onlywhen
these data are available will it be possible to calculate an
accurate case mortality rate. However, it is likely that the
mortality rate of this infection is over 10% (Booth et al.,
2003). In view of its ability to spread in the hospital
environment to health-care workers (HCW), it is likely that
SARS will alter medical practice in many ways.
Virus transmission
Some patients, like the index patient at the hotel in Hong
Kong, appear to shed large amounts of virus, resulting in a
very large number of secondary cases. These patients have
been described in other viral infections such as Ebola
haemorrhagic fever (Khan et al., 1999) and are termed
‘super-spreaders’. This epidemiological model assumes that
there is no asymptomatic carrier state and, although there is
no evidence of such a state, it has been noted that, in some
outbreaks, there are mild cases of infection (Poutanen et al.,
2003). This difference has been ascribed to age, genetic
predisposition, smoking, previous immunity and co-infec-
tion with another pathogen. Should it be found that
asymptomatic carriage occurs, control of the SARS corona-
virus is going to be extremely difﬁcult.
The route of transmission seems to be via aerosolized
droplets. The portal of entry is thought to be inhalation or
contact with mucous membranes and/or conjunctiva. Virus
isalsopresentinfaeces,andabout25%ofpatientscomplain
of diarrhoea (Zhao et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2003; Poutanen et
al., 2003). The high attack rate in medical staff is probably a
function of the stage at which patients present and the
production of virus-containing aerosol when medical pro-
cedures (such as suction and intubation) are undertaken
without adequate protection (Donnelly et al., 2003).
Transmission to health-care workers (HCW)
One of the biggest concerns around the spread of SARS has
beenthehighrateofinfectionsamongstHCWandinhealth-
caresettings.IntheGreaterTorontoarea,111ofthe144cases
admittedtohospitalhadexposuretoSARSinahospital,and
73 (51%) were HCWs (Booth et al., 2003). In Hong Kong,
among 138 cases of secondary and tertiary spread, 85 (62%)
involved HCWs (Lee et al., 2003). Most of this spread was
prior to the recognition of the aerosol, environmental and
fomite spread of the virus. This has led to speciﬁc recom-
mendations of nursing of suspected cases in negative-
pressure isolation or a single side room. Protocols have been
set up for patients meeting the clinical case-deﬁnitions to be
recognized early and isolated appropriately. HCWs in con-
tact with patients have adopted speciﬁc infection-control
measures, including the use of face masks with ﬁlter
efﬁciencies of 95% or above, use of gloves and eye and head
protection (Seto et al., 2003) and careful attention to hand-
washing. Not since the advent of HIV have such stringent
infection-control procedures been adopted so universally by
HCWs. However, despite these measures, there have been
reportsoftransmissiontoHCWsintheintensive-caresetting
(HongKongDepartmentofHealth,2003).Thisisthoughtto
be as a result of aerosol-generating procedures like non-
invasive ventilation, endotracheal intubation, open tracheal
suction, use of nebulizers and bronchoscopy. The recogni-
tion that there is a signiﬁcant increase in viraemia in the
second week of the illness (Peiris et al., 2003) and that
patients requiring intensive care may therefore have high
levels of circulating virus support this increased risk. More-
over, it is now apparent that the virus can survive for over
24 h outside the body on environmental surfaces (WHO,
2003a). This has led to many treatment centres minimizing
or avoiding certain high-risk procedures and adopting
protocols that include the use of hood respirators with a
ﬁltered air-supply for unavoidable procedures. Such equip-
ment is expensive and requires extensive training to gown
and de-gown safely and, unless teams are comfortable with
andfullyversedintheiruse,thismayleadtoincreasedriskof
contamination. A recent report of the investigation of one
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appropriate training in the execution of existing infection-
control procedures (Health Canada, 2003).
Clinical features
Infection
Incubation period ranges from 2 to 10 days and early
symptoms are fever, myalgia and headache. Fever appears
to be almost universal and is often the presenting feature,
although some patients present with mild respiratory symp-
toms(Boothetal.2003).Therespiratoryphasestartsafter3–
7 days, with a dry cough and dyspnoea. In some patients,
hypoxia develops and progressive pulmonary inﬁltrates
appear on the chest X-ray. In China, this has been called
the ‘blossoming ﬂower’ lesion. The inﬁltrates are typically
peripheral and astudy using thin-section CT hasshown this,
together with a characteristic ‘crazy-paving’ appearance due
tothickeningofinterlobular septa(Wongetal.,2003).Some
patients develop respiratory failure and require ventilation.
This presents considerable cross-infection control problems
(see above). There is some evidence that non-invasive
methods of ventilation may be associated with a better
outcome, but there are concerns that this approach to
ventilation may be associatedwith thegenerationof aerosols
andanincreasedriskofviraltransmission(Zhaoetal.,2003).
Insomepatients,theillnessisbiphasicinthat,4–7daysafter
defervescenceofpyrexia,newinﬁltratesappearonX-rayand
respiratory failure worsens; these patients often do badly.
Consistent laboratory ﬁndings are a thrombocytopenia and
leucopenia, which particularly affects lymphocytes. Consis-
tent with virus replication in organs other than lung is the
elevation of creatine kinase, lactate dehydrogenase and liver
transaminases (Tsang et al., 2003; Booth et al., 2003). In a
multivariate analysis, the independent predictors of an
adverse outcome were advanced age (odds ratio per decade
oflife,1·80;95%conﬁdenceinterval, 1·16–2·81;P ¼ 0·009),
a high peak lactate dehydrogenase level (odds ratio per
100 U l 1, 2·09; 95% conﬁdence interval, 1·28–3·42;
P ¼ 0·003) and an absolute neutrophil count that exceeded
the upper limit of the normal range on presentation (odds
ratio, 1·60; 95% conﬁdence interval, 1·03–2·50; P ¼ 0·04)
(Lee et al., 2003).
Diagnosis
Thelaboratoryteststhatcanbeappliedforroutine diagnosis
are PCR and immunoﬂuorescent ELISA detection of serum
antibodies using SARS coronavirus from Vero cell culture.
Early efforts at the University of Hong Kong using random
RT-PCR provided 646 bp of genomic sequence, from which
a diagnostic PCR was developed (Peiris et al., 2003). Parallel
efforts in Hamburg yielded three fragments that, when
sequenced, did not overlap with a 400 bp fragment reported
the day before (24 March 2003) by the CDC (Drosten et al.,
2003). Nested primers were designed bythe Hamburg group
withintheorﬂab region,whichencodestheviralreplicase1B
(Marra et al., 2003). The Hamburg group found ﬁve of the
patientswithprobableSARSstudiedtobepositivewithallof
their primers, both nested and non-nested. Only three of 13
suspected patients were positive. The group also developed a
real-time quantitative PCR that showed that the concentra-
tion of viralRNAwashighestinsputumandlowinnose and
throat swabs, suggesting that sputum is the best diagnostic
sample. The index patient had very high viral loads
[8·3 3 106 virus copies (ml sputum) 1]. This ﬁts with the
highly infectious nature of patients at presentation. Low
levelsofviruswerefoundonday9inserum,suggestingalong
viraemic phase and replication of the virus outside the
respiratory tract (exempliﬁed by deranged liver function
tests). Viral RNA was also found in the faeces of patients late
inconvalescence,afeatureofothercoronaviruses(Choetal.,
2001).Extendedtestingofpatientsandcontactsforantibody
to SARS coronavirus will be important in the future to
delineate spread and to identify asymptomatic carriage. The
CDC group also developed RT-PCR and an ELISA as well as
IFA for antibody detection (Ksiazek et al., 2003). Through
the efforts of the WHO, a standardized PCR protocol is now
available in participating national reference laboratories.
Outcome
One study has determined a more accurate estimate of the
case fatality rate than initial work early in the epidemic.
Dependingonthestatisticalmethodused,mortalityin, 60-
year-old patients was 13·2 or 6·8% and, for . 60 years, 43·3
or 55·0% (Donnelly et al., 2003). This rate was higher than
the cumulative rates given previously by the WHO and local
authorities.Oneoftheexplanationsisthatthestudywasable
to allow for new patients that had been added to the
denominator but that had not yet experienced mortality.
Global control
In an effort to co-ordinate a global public health effort to
curb the spread of SARS, early recognition and isolation of
cases remain key elements in formulating local, national or
international strategies. Epidemiological monitoring of the
outbreakintermsofnumbersofcases,clusteringofcasesand
documenting exposures has been crucial in identifying
modes of transmission and incubation period (Donnelly et
al., 2003). The WHO devised case-deﬁnitions based on close
contact with a suspected case or travel to an area reporting
localtransmissionassociatedwithsymptomsofarespiratory
tract infection and radiological changes. Now that the ﬁrst-
generation tests for the SARS coronavirus have been devel-
oped, these have been incorporated into the case-deﬁnitions
(CDC, 2003). However, viral cultures and viral detection in
patient secretions and excretions by RT-PCR remain rela-
tively insensitive for a reliable early diagnosis. Serological
diagnosis is likely to provide deﬁnitive diagnosis based on
acute and convalescent specimens. Detailed clinical features
and prognostic markers for disease progression have been
characterized (Booth et al., 2003; Hsu et al., 2003; Lee et al.,
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become widespread and contact histories difﬁcult to assess,
these features may be useful in identifying cases.
In order for the case-deﬁnitions to remain a valid tool, daily
reporting of probable cases and areas reporting community
transmission have been collated by WHO and disseminated
via their website (http://www.who.ch). After early spread of
the disease to Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam and Canada,
travelwarningsrestrictingtraveltoaffectedareaswereissued
by the WHO and exit screening wasintroduced for travellers
from these areas (WHO, 2003b). Although the incubation
period of the illness is short (Donnelly et al. 2003) and
transmission is only believed to occur after the onset of
symptoms, the effectiveness of such measures is yet to be
determined.
At national and local levels, strenuous control measures, in
additiontoinfectioncontrolaroundknowncases,havebeen
adopted. In areas where community transmission has been
reported, vigorous public education in reporting symptoms,
early isolation of possible cases, exhaustive contact tracing
and isolation and quarantine measures were introduced,
often requiring emergency legislation. As the epidemic has
evolved, the possibility of an environmental source of
transmission of SARS coronavirus has become apparent. At
the end of March 2003, 320 cases of SARS were reported
amongst the residents of Amoy Gardens, a block of apart-
ments in Hong Kong, where sewage contamination was the
likelysourceofinfection.Closuresofbuildings,hospitalsand
schools and markets have been required. The economic
impact of such measures will be enormous, but there have
been successes. Vietnam was the ﬁrst affected country to
terminate community and hospital transmission success-
fully.CanadaandthePhilippineswerenexttodeclarecontrol
oftheinfection(butseebelow), sincefollowedbySingapore.
Unfortunately,inChinaandTaiwan,theepidemiccontinues
to grow.
The situation in the UK
In the UK, the Health Protection Agency, via the SARS co-
ordinatingcommittee,hasbeen instrumental informulating
and implementing a public health strategy for protecting the
population from SARS. This includes reporting of suspected
cases, contact tracing and surveillance of cases and contacts.
AsofMay2003,uptoeightprobablecasesandmorethan150
suspectedcaseshadbeenreportedintheUK.Apartfromone,
alltheprobablecaseshavehadcontactsabroad.Fourofthese
cases have subsequently been discarded on the basis of an
alternativediagnosisandonlyoneoftheremaining probable
cases has had a coronavirus infection conﬁrmed by serology
(Health Protection Agency, 2003).
Treatment
The inﬂuence of treatment regimens intuitively has an effect
on mortality and, in such a fast-evolving epidemic, it is hard
toundertaketightly designedtrials.However, theexperience
of the ﬁrstmajoroutbreak inthe world in Guangzhou shows
someimportanttrends(Zhaoetal.,2003).Some190patients
wererandomizedtofourdifferenttreatmentregimens.Itwas
found that very-high-dose steroids given early with non-
invasive ventilation offered the best outcome; there was no
convincing evidence that ribavirin helped. Recently, a very
smallstudyhassupportedtheseﬁndings(Soetal.,2003).The
Guangzhougroupwentontotreatafurther160patientswith
the optimal regimen, with only three deaths. At the time this
study was undertaken, no diagnostic tests were available, so
onlyclinicalcase-deﬁnitionscouldbeused.Thismeansthere
may be an excess of suspect cases, leading to a lower
mortality.
The clinical features of SARS are now well recognized. Many
of the characteristic features were described in early reports
(Tsang et al., 2003; Booth et al., 2003). Treatment remains
supportive; early hopes that ribavirin would be effective
(Koren et al., 2003) have not been borne out by experience
(Zhao et al., 2003). The use of corticosteroids, particularly at
highdoses,isimportantandtwostudies,onewith31patients
and the other with 190, support this action (So et al., 2003;
Zhao et al.,2003). Much effort will doubtless be expended in
developing antiviral agents in the future.The majorprotease
of SARS coronavirus is a potential target and has been
expressedinEscherichiacoli(Anandetal.,2003).Preliminary
characterization shows that it retains many of the structural
motifs found in other coronavirus proteases. Molecular
modelling suggests that inhibitors such as AG7088 would
serve as good lead compounds for development of speciﬁc
antivirals.
The fate of the epidemic
China was the source of SARS coronavirus and remains the
worstaffectedcountry,with5013oftheworld’s7447caseson
12May2003.Almosthalf(252)ofthetotaldeaths(552)have
also been there. Spread of SARS from the developed cities of
the eastern coastal region to inland rural areas may make
controlanderadicationmuchharder.ReportsthatSARShas
beenidentiﬁed in Hebei, Anhui,Guangxi and Henan (Parry,
2003)areworrying.Thelatterprovinceisestimatedtohave1
million HIV carriers, and the interaction of this virus with
individuals with an attenuated immune system is another
great unknown in the rapidly unfolding SARS story. There
are encouraging reports that the epidemic is being con-
trolled, but the difﬁculties experienced in Toronto (WHO,
2003a), with a new outbreak after the epidemic was declared
over, mean that we cannot be complacent about controlling
this new threat to public health.
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